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The New Wheel in the Federal Machine:
From Sovereignty to Jurisdiction in the Early Republic
Alison L. LaCroix*
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The years between 1787 and 1802 witnessed a transformation in American
federal theory: from the focus on legislative authority that had occupied
constitutional thinkers since the colonial period to a new emphasis on
jurisdiction and a corresponding institutional preoccupation with courts.
This shift is evident in the decades-long debate concerning the nature and
scope of the federal judicial power, which saw repeated efforts by jurists
and statecrafters to establish the proper jurisdictional arrangement to
mediate between the multiple levels of government set forth in the
Constitution. The fruits of these struggles to cement the practical and
ideological meanings of federalism were the judiciary acts of 1789 and
1801. The two acts have received remarkably disparate treatment from
scholars, with the 1789 act heralded as the basis of the federal judicial
system and the 1801 act largely regarded as an embarrassment notable
only for its role in the partisan conflict surrounding the election of 1800.
Instead of lionizing the 1789 act and attempting to excuse or dismiss the
1801 act, however, I read the two together to offer new insights into these
crucial decades. In the 1801 act, Federalists sought to revive the colonial
idea of subject-matter jurisdiction by establishing broad federal
jurisdiction, including granting “arising under” jurisdiction to the federal
courts and easing the requirements for removal of cases from state to
federal court. The election of 1800 and the ensuing repeal of the 1801 act,
however, spelled the demise of this idea of jurisdiction and a return to the
type of concurrence and overlap among levels of government that had
characterized the system set up by the 1789 act. As a chapter in my
forthcoming book on the history of the American federal idea, this essay
challenges the assumption underlying some modern federalism
scholarship that nationalization through the federal judiciary is a
relatively new, post-1937 phenomenon. My argument demonstrates the
anachronistic nature of such assumptions by highlighting the centrality of
the judiciary to early republican debates concerning the scope and extent
of national power.
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Legal historians and constitutional scholars have tended to approach the judiciary
acts of 1789 and 1801 as though the two statutes were separated not only by a dozen
years but also by a fundamental, unbridgeable conceptual gulf. While the Judiciary Act
of 17891 is celebrated as “probably the most important and the most satisfactory Act ever
passed by Congress,” as Justice Henry B. Brown hailed it in 1911, the Judiciary Act of
18012 is frequently regarded as a forgettable relic of early national political squabbling.3
The storied heritage of the 1789 act began with its passage into law more than four
months before the Supreme Court convened for its first session, and therefore well in
advance of the date when the entire federal government can truly be said to have begun
functioning;4 the 1801 act, in contrast, is remembered principally for a pair of
controversial distinctions: first, creating the circuit courts to which President John Adams
appointed the so-called “midnight judges” on the eve of his departure from office; and
second, suffering repeal at the hands of the newly Republican Congress one year later, in
the aftermath of the acrimonious election of 1800. As Kathryn Turner Preyer observed,
“[A]wareness of the Act seems to have been kept alive chiefly because it must be
summoned to serve as the cause of its own repeal in March 1802.”5 If the 1789 act stands
for the fulfillment of the “Madisonian compromise” reached at Philadelphia, in which the
delegates agreed to postpone the divisive issue of inferior federal courts to the First
Congress, the 1801 act represents the failure of compromise, when the first party system
collided with unsettled questions regarding the structure of the federal judiciary.6
Clearly, the two acts have received quite disparate treatment over the course of
the past two centuries. But this difference fails to take into account their meaning and
context in light of their shared historical moment. Too often, each judiciary act has been
treated as an isolated piece of legislation complete in itself rather than as an intellectual
vestige of a particular moment in American legal and political discourse. But the acts
have more to tell us than this. Considering the two acts as disjunctive and dichotomous
1

An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (Judiciary Act of
1789).
2

An Act to Provide for the More Convenient Organization of the Courts of the United States, 2 Stat. 89
(1801) (Judiciary Act of 1801) (repealed by Judiciary Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 132 (1802)).
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Henry B. Brown, The New Federal Judicial Code, 36 ABA Rep 339, 345 (1911), quoted in Charles
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv L Rev 49, 52 (1923).
4

The first session of the Supreme Court – attended by only four of the six original justices – took place in
New York on February 2, 1790. See Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 1-2 (Chicago
4th ed. 2004).
5

Kathryn Turner [Preyer], Federalist Policy and the Judiciary Act of 1801, 22 Wm & Mary Q 3, 3 (3d
ser., 1965). See also William E. Nelson, The Province of the Judiciary, 37 John Marshall L Rev 325, 336
(stating that “[t]he 1801 Act, as we know, was a failure”).
6

On the Madisonian compromise, see Martin H. Redish and Curtis E. Woods, Congressional Power to
Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U Pa L Rev
45, 52-56 (1975); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for
the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U Pa L Rev 741, 763-764 (1984).
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overlooks the vital role that both statutes played in the development of American
federalism. Instead of lionizing the 1789 act and attempting to excuse or dismiss the
1801 act, reading the two together offers new insights into the crucial decades between
1787 and 1802, when theorists and politicians struggled to give meaning to the
Constitution’s phrase, “the judicial power of the United States.”
If one regards the years from 1787 to 1802 as a single period and then situates that
period at the end of a larger sweep of Anglo-American constitutional ferment, the two
judiciary acts take on new significance beyond simply completing the founding
settlement. On this view, the importance of the acts lies beyond their immediate
consequences for the balance between state and federal judicial power, or even for the
broader question of the meaning of union at the dawn of the nineteenth century. Rather,
the debate surrounding the judiciary acts implicates federal ideas in the broadest sense –
that is, the specifically late-eighteenth-century/early-nineteenth-century effort to bring
together multiple levels of authority within a single government while maintaining lines
of demarcation between the levels. In other words, the judiciary acts must be understood
as important sites for the development of federal theory, not simply as component parts in
the heroic story of the construction of the modern American republic.
The passage of the judiciary acts, then, should be examined in the context of the
continuing development of American federal ideas as ideas in the early republican
period. The acts of 1789 and 1801 are vital to the story of federalism because their
passage signaled a shift from legislative-focused theorizing, which had characterized the
years roughly between 1765 and 1787, to a new emphasis on the role of judicial power in
establishing and delineating boundaries between the levels of authority within a multilayered polity.7 Some scholars have pointed out the significance of the acts, especially
the 1789 act, for establishing the federal judiciary in the separation-of-powers
framework.8 Other commentators have explored the institutional role of the courts, vis-àvis other actors such as Congress or the states, in maintaining (or, in some cases,
confounding) the federal structure.9 Rather than focusing on judicial supremacy at either
the horizontal level of separation-of-powers analysis or the vertical level of state-federal
relations, however, my analysis seeks to situate the judiciary acts in the context of the
Revolutionary and early republican struggles to construct a federal union that was more
7

On the general shift in focus from legislatures to courts – especially by the Federalists – in the ratification
period, see, for example, Nelson, 37 John Marshall L Rev at 340-49 (cited in note 5); Gordon S. Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 at 537-38 (W.W. Norton 1969).
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See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 227-32 (Random House
2005); Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the
Federal Courts, 1989 Duke LJ 1421.
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See, for example, Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review (Oxford: 2004); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process: A Functional
Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court 171-259 (Chicago 1980); Alexander M. Bickel, The
Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Bobbs-Merrill 1962); Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rôle of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 543 (1954).
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centralized than the old Confederation but less unitary in its distribution of sovereignty
than the British Empire.10 On this view, the judiciary acts should be understood not only
as markers in the retrospective, modern narrative of how the United States came to have
to courts that it now has, but as experiments in fleshing out the sometimes ill-defined
scheme of federal government that had slowly been emerging in America since the
1760s.
The two acts must be seen on their own terms, as attempts by particular
individuals to confront functional questions of governmental authority that more than two
decades’ worth of thought and debate had left unaddressed. The turn to the judiciary in
1789 represented a subtle but important departure from the prominent role that the
legislature had played in the past several decades’ theories of divided authority. AngloAmerican theorists of the pre- and post-Revolutionary eras had for the most part shared
their metropolitan cousins’ emphasis on the legislative power as the most significant
player in the contemporary constitutional arrangement. Many Americans, however,
declined to follow this theory to the conclusion that was increasingly gaining adherents in
Britain, among them Sir William Blackstone: namely, that the legislature – specifically,
Parliament – possessed complete and indivisible sovereign authority.11 Consequently, in
the transatlantic debates of the 1760s and 1770s, Anglo-Americans began to articulate a
vision of political authority that explored new methods of segmenting power among
many levels of legislatures, rather than vesting power entirely in one supreme legislature.
In so doing, they rejected the growing orthodoxy of domestic British constitutional theory
as well as the broader applications of that theory to the British Empire. Not until 1787,
however, did the demands of the constitution-drafting process impel American thinkers to
put aside the legislative focus of their political heritage and begin experimenting with the
judicial power as a key component of the federal arrangement.12
To be sure, by 1789, the notion that the judiciary might potentially play a specific,
structural role in the architecture of the federal republic remained a highly contested idea.
It would continue to be controversial for many years, as the rancor surrounding the 1801
act and its repeal would demonstrate. But the period beginning around 1789 differed
10

On the role that theories of empire played in the early Republic, see Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Constituting
Empire: New York and the Transformation of Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830 at 203-58
(North Carolina 2005); Peter S. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire: The Language of American Nationhood 53-79
(Virginia 2000).
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In Blackstone’s view, set forth in his Commentaries on the Laws of England of 1765-69, government
required a “supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority . . . in which the rights of sovereignty
reside.” William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries *49. For Blackstone, that authority was Parliament, which
he described as possessing “sovereign and uncontrolable authority in making, confirming, enlarging,
restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible
denominations, ecclesiastical, or temporal, civil, military, maritime, or criminal.” Parliament could thus
“do every thing that is not naturally impossible.” Id.
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For a more extended discussion of the origins of American federalism in this period, see Alison L.
LaCroix, A Well-Constructed Union: An Intellectual History of American Federalism, 1754-1800 (Ph.D.
diss., Harvard University, 2007).

4

from the colonial, Revolutionary, and ratification periods in at least one crucial respect.
The final decade of the eighteenth century and the early decades of the nineteenth century
witnessed a transformation from sovereignty to jurisdiction as the central organizing
principle – and battlefield – of American federalism.
As I will demonstrate, pre- and postwar debates regarding the essential nature of
sovereignty – an inquiry that had occupied political theorists since the early modern era –
slowly gave way in the early republican period to a search for the proper jurisdictional
arrangement to mediate between the multiple levels of government contemplated in the
Constitution. This quest to find the appropriate structural mechanisms to avoid the
“solecism” of an imperium in imperio, or a government within a government, continued
to haunt early republicans, just as it had plagued their predecessors during the Stamp Act
crisis of the 1760s and the confrontations between colonial assemblies and royal
governors of the 1770s.13 Yet although they employed this inherited vocabulary,
theorists and politicians in the 1790s and 1800s conceived of their problem not in terms
of locating the initial source of governmental authority but instead as a question of
delineating the boundaries among the judicial bodies that would guide the exercise of that
authority. This second-generation process sought to fill in gaps and decipher hints left by
the Constitutional Convention. In so doing, early republican theorists seized on Article
III and the Supremacy Clause to guide their efforts to establish institutions that would
carry out the federal project. The goal of this project was to build a structure to support
the federal aspirations of the Constitution. The material of this structure was a theory of
federal jurisdiction.
My analysis examines the rise of jurisdiction as the defining element of American
federalism. Beginning around 1789, the organization of the federal judiciary became the
locus of debates concerning both the practical and the ideological meaning of federalism.
Commentators as diverse as Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, John Marshall,
Theodore Sedgwick, Joseph Story, and St. George Tucker focused on jurisdiction as they
hammered out their own working understandings of federalism and confronted those of
their contemporaries. This account thus challenges the assumption underlying some
modern federalism scholarship that nationalization through the federal judiciary is a
relatively new, post-1937 phenomenon. My argument demonstrates the anachronistic
nature of such assumptions by highlighting the centrality of the judiciary to the nation’s
earliest debates concerning the scope and extent of national power. To be sure, general
federal question jurisdiction did not become a stable fixture of American law until 1875.
That date does not mean, however, that for the previous eighty-six years any consensus
13

The “solecism” of imperium in imperio was a powerful rhetorical device invoked repeatedly throughout
eighteenth-century Anglo-American debates. See, for example, Federalist 20 (Madison with Hamilton), in
The Federalist 128-29 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed) (describing “a sovereignty over sovereigns, a
government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals” as
“a solecism in theory” and “in practice”). As Daniel Hulsebosch has demonstrated, the pejorative dated
back at least to 1720, when Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, referred to imperium in imperio as a
“Solecism in Politicks.” Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Imperia in Imperio: The Multiple Constitutions of Empire in
New York, 1750-1777, 16 Law and Hist Rev 319, 340 n.58 (1998), citing [Bolingbroke], The Country
Journal, or the Craftsman, no. 172, October 18, 1729.
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had held that the scope of federal courts’ jurisdiction was limited, and properly so. On
the contrary: viewing the expansion of federal jurisdiction as purely a postReconstruction or a twentieth-century phenomenon ignores important early republican
antecedents to those later developments. The period between 1787 and 1802 witnessed a
transformation in American constitutional discourse from the language of legislative
power and sovereignty to that of judicial power and jurisdiction.

I.

Defining the Judicial Power, 1787-1789.
A.

Background: Convention and Constitution.

The period between 1789 and 1802 witnessed the increased salience of the
judicial power in the ongoing American dialogue regarding the proper arrangement of the
layers of governmental power in a federal republic. In order to see this subtle but
fundamental transformation in early national modes of thought, we must in a sense
undomesticate the judiciary acts by examining them outside the familiar tropes of, on the
one hand, the state-versus-federal binary that often preoccupies American constitutional
history, and, on the other hand, twentieth- and twenty-first-century debates concerning
the scope of modern federal courts’ jurisdiction. Without question, those debates are
important, and they occupy a deservedly central place in constitutional law and federal
courts scholarship.14 But in order to comprehend the judiciary acts’ significance for the
historical narrative of federalism’s origins, a wider perspective is necessary. This
perspective begins with an inquiry into the particular legal and political context in which
the acts were created.
When the First Congress convened in April 1789, fifty-four of the congressmen
and senators had recently served as members of the Constitutional Convention or of the
state ratification conventions.15 As part of those earlier deliberations, the members would
have been involved in discussions concerning two measures that emerged in the course of
the debates at Philadelphia and that shaped the role of the judiciary in the new republic.
Although the provisions had different aims, taken together they suggested that judicial
institutions would feature prominently in the new government that was being cobbled
together.

14

The literature concerning Congress’s power to regulate the scope of federal jurisdiction is enormous.
The classic account is Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv L Rev 1362 (1953). More recent analyses include John
Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article III, 64
U Chi L Rev 203 (1997); Akhil Reed Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U
Pa L Rev 1499 (1990); Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers
of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 BU L Rev 205 (1985); Clinton, 132 U Pa L Rev at 741 (cited in note 6); Gerald
Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the
Ongoing Debate, 36 Stan L Rev 895 (1984).

15

Richard Morris, ed., Encyclopedia of American History 145 (Harper & Row 6th ed 1982).
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The first such measure, the so-called “Madisonian compromise,” consisted of a
provision that “the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals”; the
measure was adopted by the convention on June 5, 1787, after substantial debate.16 It
was in the nature of a compromise in that it staved off a motion by John Rutledge of
South Carolina to delete all references to inferior federal courts from the draft
constitution, but it did not go as far as mandating the establishment of inferior federal
courts, as had been proposed in Edmund Randolph’s Virginia Plan or South Carolinian
Charles Pinckney’s draft constitution.17 Instead, the compromise was incorporated into
Article III, which vested the “judicial Power of the United States” in “one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time establish.”18
In addition to the Madisonian compromise, which established the potential for but
not the certainty of inferior federal courts, the delegates at Philadelphia and in the state
ratifying conventions engaged in a related debate that concerned not the horizontal
relationship between Congress and lower federal courts but instead the vertical
interaction between the general government and the states. Madison and other delegates
such as Pinckney and James Wilson of Pennsylvania feared that the states might continue
the unruly and independent behavior that they had displayed throughout the 1780s. A
government capable of accommodating multiple levels of authority had been many
colonists’ desideratum since the 1760s, but the reality of the 1780s forced observers to
reconsider the structure of this multi-tiered polity. How might the state legislatures be
checked in their rush to issue paper currency, pass debtor-relief laws, deny the provisions
of the peace treaty with Britain, and otherwise follow state rather than larger, national
interests?19
As his voluminous notes and correspondence before the convention and his
comments on the floor at Philadelphia made clear, Madison believed that he had the
answer: the Constitution should grant Congress the power to negative state laws “in all
cases whatsoever” – or at least, as other delegates suggested, in situations where
Congress deemed the state law in question “improper.”20 In other words, Madison hoped
16

1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 125 (Yale 1966) (Max Farrand, ed). For classic
articulations of the Madisonian compromise, see Redish and Woods, 124 U Pa L Rev at 52-56 (cited in
note 6); Clinton, 132 U Pa L Rev at 763-764 (cited in note 6).
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See 1 Records of the Federal Convention 104-05, 119, 124-25; 2 id at 45-46 (cited in note 16).

18

US Const Art III, § 1, cl. 1.

19

On the turmoil of the 1780s and its consequences for the drafting of the Constitution, see Wood, The
Creation of the American Republic at 393-429 (cited in note 7).

20

Madison had aired his proposal for the federal negative in letters to Thomas Jefferson, Edmund
Randolph, and George Washington as early as March 1787. The negative was a central feature of the
Virginia Plan, which Randolph proposed at an early meeting of the Philadelphia convention. It attracted
little controversy or even notice until June 8, at which point Pinckney’s motion to expand the scope of
Congress’s from negativing state laws “contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles
of Union” to cover laws that Congress simply deemed “improper” galvanized debate. See 1 Records of the
Federal Convention 164-73, 2 id. 25-36 (cited in note 16). For Madison’s letters, see 9 The Papers of
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to use the legislative power of the general government to quell the wayward lawmaking
tendencies of the several states. After much discussion – including an impassioned
defense by Madison, who regarded the negative as “absolutely necessary to a perfect
system” – the proposal suffered a series of defeats, culminating in its rejection on July 17
by a vote of seven states to three.21 Despite the failure of the negative, however, many of
Madison’s fellow delegates appear to have agreed with his judgment that checks on the
“centrifugal tendency of the States” were necessary to prevent them from “continually
fly[ing] out of their proper orbits and destroy the order & harmony of the political
system.”22 A mechanism had to be found by which the states might be both restrained
from exploiting each other and coaxed into aligning their interests with those of the
Union.
The mechanism that the delegates settled on was a bold statement of federal
supremacy that emerged more or less simultaneously with the demise of the negative.23
Adopting the language of William Paterson’s New Jersey Plan, the delegates drafted
what became the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.24 In contrast to Madison’s scheme,
which had embraced a legislative solution to the problem of mediating between the levels
of authority within the federal republic, the Supremacy Clause presented the judiciary as
a potential site of intergovernmental ordering. In this way, the clause addressed
Madison’s twin goals, as he subsequently described them in a letter to Jefferson: “1. to
prevent encroachments on the General authority. 2. to prevent instability and injustice in
the legislation of the States.”25 By identifying “the Laws of the United States” as the
“supreme Law of the Land,” which would in turn bind the “Judges in every State,” the
clause spoke the language of court-made law. One reads the Supremacy Clause and
thinks of the interpretation of law through processes of adjudication, not the creation of
law through the legislative process.

James Madison 317, 369, 383 (Chicago 1975) (Robert Rutland et al., eds). On the federal negative, see
LaCroix, A Well-Constructed Union at 217-83 (cited in note 12).
21

1 Records of the Federal Convention 164 (cited in note 16).
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1 id. at 165.
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The final vote on the negative took place on July 17, 1787; immediately thereafter, the delegates took up
the provision that would become the Supremacy Clause. See 2 id. 28-29. See also Kramer, The People
Themselves at 74-75 (cited in note 9); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New
Contexts, 49 Stan L Rev 1031, 1046-47 (1997); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in
the Making of the Constitution 82-83 (Vintage 1996); Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980
Term – Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 95 Harv L Rev 17, 46-47 (1981).

24

US Const Art VI cl 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).

25

10 Papers of James Madison 209-10 (cited in note 20).
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The evidence suggests that at least some members of the founding generation
believed that the shift from the negative to the Supremacy Clause as a key federalismenforcing mechanism meant that the Supreme Court very likely possessed the power to
review actions by both state legislatures and state courts.26 During the convention,
Thomas Jefferson, at that time serving as minister to the Court of Versailles, conveyed to
Madison his dislike for the negative and suggested that courts rather than Congress might
be charged with policing the states. The negative, Jefferson wrote, “proposes to mend a
small hole by covering the whole garment.”27 He disapproved of vesting Congress with
such a broad – and potentially open-ended – power. Would it not be preferable, Jefferson
asked, to rely on a more elegant solution that required less apparatus? “[A]n appeal from
the state judicature to a federal court, in all cases where the act of the Confederation
controled the question” would “be as effectual a remedy, & exactly commensurate to the
defect.”28 For Jefferson, allowing an injured party to appeal from a state court to a
federal court was preferable to building an ex ante system of legislative review into the
Constitution.
On the floor of the convention, other delegates similarly assumed that the
alternative to the negative was case-by-case review by courts. Arguing that including the
negative in the Constitution would “disgust all the States,” New Yorker Gouverneur
Morris articulated the judicial approach: “A law that ought to be negatived will be set
aside in the Judiciary departmt. and if that security should fail; may be repealed by a
Nationl. law.”29 In other words, judicial review of state law and state-court decisions was
at least a possibility for delegates to the convention and their contemporaries.30
26

By “federalism-enforcing mechanism,” I mean federalism in the structural, mechanical sense that most
concerned Madison: namely, the need to incorporate the states into the general government, and in so doing
to move from a confederation – the early modern political philosophers’ “system of states” – to a new
species of federal republic in which the central government had some independent powers rather than
acting merely as a shell for the states. The construction “system of states” is associated with the early
modern theorist Samuel von Pufendorf. See Samuel von Pufendorf, The Law of Nature and Nations: or, a
General System of the most Important Principles of Morality, Jurisprudence, and Politics, trans. Basil
Kennet (London 5th ed: 1749) (1672), vol. II, bk. VII, ch. V, § XVIII, 682-83. The phrase “judicially
enforced federalism” has been used in modern scholarship to refer to courts’ acting on behalf of substantive
federal values, including “limits on the power of the national government vis-à-vis the states.” Larry D.
Kramer, But When Exactly Was Judicially-Enforced Federalism “Born” in the First Place?, 22 Harv J L &
Pub Policy 123, 123 (1998). For the source of the related debate regarding the need for the federal
government to protect federalism by acting on behalf of the states, see Wechsler, The Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 54 Colum L Rev at 543 (cited in note 9). See also Gerald Leonard, Party as a “Political
Safeguard of Federalism”: Martin Van Buren and the Constitutional Theory of Party Politics, 54 Rutgers
L Rev 221 (2001); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,
100 Colum L Rev 215 (2000).
27

10 Papers of James Madison 64 (cited in note 20).

28

Id.

29

2 Records of the Federal Convention 28 (cited in note 16).

30

Morris later commented that portions of Article III had intentionally been drafted (by him) to speak in
somewhat oblique terms. “[C]onflicting opinions had been maintained with so much professional
astuteness, that it became necessary to select phrasaes, which expressing my own notions would not alarm
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But this vision of the judicial power of the United States concerned only the
Supreme Court. It said nothing about the lower federal courts that Congress might
eventually choose to establish, and therefore it provided few definitive answers to the
question what the full judicial power of the United States might look like. Explication of
those issues awaited the First Congress, where the veterans of the ratification debates and
their colleagues together took up the question that, among a host of divisive issues that
had vexed the Constitutional Convention, had been postponed to be dealt with by the
legislature.
In the nineteen months between the end of the convention and the first meeting of
Congress, the subject of inferior federal courts had generated prolonged and intense
discussion. During the ratification debates in the states, pamphlets and speeches had
focused on the issue as one of the key sites of dispute between supporters and opponents
of the new constitution.31 The fervor with which commentators attacked the question of
the federal courts suggests that they regarded jurisdictional decisions as central to
defining the new republic.
Indeed, the provisions of the Constitution concerning the judicial power gave rise
to some of the most vehement disagreements between Federalists and Antifederalists.
The establishment of the Supreme Court proved relatively uncontroversial.32 The
prospect of an entirely new echelon of federal courts in addition to the Supreme Court,
however, tested many observers’ deepest constitutional commitments. In Federalist No.
81, Alexander Hamilton argued that inferior federal courts ought to be viewed merely as
ancillae of the Supreme Court and not as independent forces of consolidation. Calling
the establishment of federal district courts “highly expedient and useful,” Hamilton
concluded that “[t]his plan appears to me at present the most eligible of any that could be

others, nor shock their selflove, and to the best of my recollection, this was the only part which passed
without cavil.” Morris to Timothy Pickering, Dec. 22, 1814, 3 id at 420. By the nineteenth century, the
notion that judicial review had been adopted in place of the negative was a commonplace, at least for some
theorists. See, for example, Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 607
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adopted.”33 A few weeks later, John Marshall offered Virginia’s ratifying convention a
practical argument for the new courts. “Does not every Gentleman here know, that the
causes in our Courts are more numerous than they can decide, according to their present
construction?” he asked. The future chief justice then exhorted his colleagues to “[l]ook
at the dockets. You will find them crouded with suits, which the life of man will not see
determined.”34
Yet strong voices such as that of Maryland’s Luther Martin lambasted the plan.
Permitting Congress to appoint inferior courts “would eventually absorb and swallow up
the state judiciaries,” Martin insisted, “by drawing all business from them to the courts of
the general government, which the extensive and undefined powers, legislative and
judicial, of which it is possessed, would easily enable it to do.”35 George Mason of
Virginia, meanwhile, feared potential expansion of federal power under Article III. “The
inferior Courts are to be as numerous as Congress may think proper,” he warned. “Read
the second section, and contemplate attentively the jurisdiction of these Courts; and
consider if there be any limits to it.”36
Controversy regarding the establishment of the inferior federal courts thus
smoldered during the ratification period, with each side in the debate invoking the first
sentence of Article III (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”) as evidence of either Philadelphian prudence or consolidationist
connivance.37 Few observers could have been surprised, then, when on April 7, 1789, the
First Congress took up the issue as its first item of business. Throughout the spring and
summer of 1789, public attention was fixed on Federal Hall in Wall Street. As Virginia
congressman Alexander White commented in a letter to Madison: “At the inns on the
road, I was surprised to find the knowledge which the landlords, and the country people
who were at some of them, had acquired of the debates and proceedings of Congress.”38
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B.

The Judiciary Act of 1789.

The history of the 1789 act’s drafting and passage is well known.39 A Senate
committee comprising ten members (one from each state that had ratified the Constitution
and sent senators by that point) produced a first version of the act, which the committee
circulated to select attorneys and officials for comment during the summer of 1789.40 On
July 17, the Senate approved the bill by a vote of fourteen to six. The House of
Representatives, which had been occupied drafting the amendments that formed the basis
of the Bill of Rights, took up the judiciary act on August 24. After extensive debate –
much of it concerning the propriety of establishing inferior federal courts at all – and the
addition of fifty-two amendments, the House passed the bill on September 17 by a vote of
thirty-seven to sixteen. House and Senate then conducted speedy negotiations regarding
some of the amendments before sending the bill on to President Washington, who signed
it into law on September 24.
The most important provisions of the act for our purposes centered on two
structural aspects: the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the organization and powers
of the inferior federal courts, which the act broke down into the two categories of district
courts and circuit courts.41 As students of Marbury v Madison will recall, the act sought
39
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to grant certain heads of original jurisdiction to the Court in addition to those contained in
Article III.42 The act also established the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, which extended
to the lower federal courts as well as the state courts.43 Despite the later salience of
section 25’s grant to the Court of the power to review state-court decisions, as
demonstrated in such cases as Martin v Hunter’s Lessee44 and Cohens v Virginia,45 in
1789 this provision generated less debate than did the architecture of inferior federal
courts that the act set up.46
The structure of the lower federal courts consisted of two parts: thirteen district
courts (one for each of the eleven then-ratifying states, plus Maine and Kentucky, which
at that time were still part of Massachusetts and Virginia, respectively), each with its own
district judge; and (2) three circuits, each requiring a quorum of two justices of the
Supreme Court and the district judge of the particular district in which the court was
sitting at a given time. The district courts possessed exclusive jurisdiction over admiralty
cases and cases involving minor federal crimes, as well as concurrent jurisdiction with
the circuit or state courts with respect to certain tort suits by aliens and certain suits by
the United States.47 The circuit courts’ original jurisdiction, meanwhile, extended to “all
suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds . . .
the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or
petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the
suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.”48 While this jurisdiction was original,
however, it was not exclusive but rather concurrent with the state courts. In addition, the
circuit courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over all major federal crimes and
appellate jurisdiction with respect to district-court cases.49 Thus, in the words of Julius
Goebel, “[i]f the District Courts were viewed primarily as courts of special jurisdiction,
the Circuit Courts were erected as courts of general original jurisdiction.”50
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As many modern commentators have noted, the 1789 act did not grant general
federal question jurisdiction to the inferior federal courts.51 Indeed, Congress did not
decisively embrace the modern, broadened version of federal question jurisdiction until
1875.52 To twentieth- and twenty-first-century eyes, this is a startling fact.53 Yet this
sense of surprise results from the assumption that the Judiciary Act of 1789 belongs only
to our own age rather than also to the late eighteenth century. After all, the language
seems familiar: the act introduced district courts and circuit courts, diversity jurisdiction,
amount-in-controversy requirements, and many other staples of a modern federal courts
course. As the foregoing discussion illustrates, however, these were not “our” district
courts or circuit courts. One need only consider the lack of a circuit-court bench, the
relative autonomy of the district courts, and the absence of the type of firm appellate
hierarchy that exists today to grasp how different the federal courts of 1789 were from
those of today.
This pervasive sense of surprise is useful, however, because it demonstrates the
importance of historicizing the judiciary act. To ask, “Why didn’t Congress grant general
federal question jurisdiction until 1875?” is to get the analysis backward. A better, less
teleological approach might be to ask, “Why did Congress grant federal question
jurisdiction in 1875?” – or, indeed, “Did Congress attempt to grant federal question
jurisdiction before 1875?” Such questions permit a more expansive view of the impetus
behind the 1789 act, as well as a richer, more contextualized picture of constitutional
thought in the early Republic, because they provide a means to connect the 1789 act with
the 1801 act – which did, in fact, establish general federal question jurisdiction, albeit
only temporarily. The 1801 act’s modern identity as a federal-courts trivium could not
seem more remote from the grave attention with which the 1789 act is greeted by
scholars, law students, and constitutional commentators generally. But the Judiciary Act
51
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of 1801 – and, perhaps even more important, the vituperative political debate that
preceded it in the 1790s – is important precisely because it reminds us of the essential
foreignness of jurisdiction theory in the early Republic. Federal jurisdiction is an idea,
and like all ideas it had a before and an after, a time when it did not exist and a later time
when it did.
Even before President Washington signed the Judiciary Act of 1789 into law,
supporters and critics alike had begun to wonder aloud whether a better system might be
possible. Madison termed the act “pregnant with difficulties, not only as relating to a part
of the constitution which has been most criticised, but being its own nature peculiarly
complicated & embarrassing.”54 (When the bill came before the House a few weeks
later, however, Madison spoke in its favor; according to published reports, the delegate
from Virginia argued that “[t]he bill may not exactly suit any one member of the House,
in all its parts – but it is as good as we can at present make it.”55) The Antifederalist
Elbridge Gerry, representing Massachusetts in the First Congress, said of the judiciary,
“[T]his department I dread as an awful tribunal,” citing the federal courts’ broad
jurisdiction over common law, equity, and admiralty cases as well as the potential for
abuse of power by judges who could not be removed by Congress.56
In keeping with the controversy that had surrounded the drafting of the act, within
a year of its passage two reform plans were proposed. In December 1790, in response to
a request from the House, Attorney General Edmund Randolph submitted a report
containing recommendations for restructuring the federal judiciary. Randolph’s report
was followed just over two months later by a set of amendments to Article III drawn up
by New York congressman Egbert Benson. Neither reform plan made much headway; on
the contrary, both ended their days languishing in committee.57 Yet Randolph’s plan
attracted substantial press notice, suggesting that at least some portion of the public was
interested in judicial reform.58 Both plans will be discussed at greater length below.

II.

Concurrence: Drawing Lines, Again.

The intellectual transition from defining questions of political and legal authority
in terms of sovereignty to defining them in terms of jurisdiction manifested itself most
profoundly in the decade following the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Writing in
early September of that year, a few weeks prior to the passage of the act, Massachusetts
congressman Fisher Ames sent a letter to his friend John Lowell (soon to become federal
54
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judge for the newly created district of Massachusetts) in which Ames detailed a speech
that he had recently delivered on the House floor. Ames’s remarks included the
following passage:
What is jurisdiction? Authority to judge, derived from a superior power__
The law of the U. S. is the law of the land, but not the law of a state__ . . .
Many tell me, the state judges must decide according to law, & the
offences &c are defined by law. . . . If we ascend to the first principles of
the Judicia[l] power, I think we shall find them analogous to my
doctrine__ . . . .59
Ames clearly regarded jurisdiction as the fundamental currency of the federal republic
and an ordered system of jurisdiction as the sine qua non of that republic’s success. And
what was jurisdiction, in Ames’s view? “Authority to judge, derived from a superior
power” – in other words, court-based authority, the source of which was a still higher
level of power.
Ames’s comments are, it must be said, somewhat elliptical.60 But they
demonstrate the degree to which the concept of jurisdiction occupied the thoughts of
politicians and theorists by 1789. The debates of the 1790s, which led to the passage of
the Judiciary Act of 1801, centered on a pair of related themes. Both concerned the
vertical distribution of authority between the states and the federal government – or, more
broadly, between the component entities and the general government in a federal
structure. The two themes were, first, the notion of concurrent jurisdiction, according to
which bodies at multiple levels of government had the power to hear cases on a given
topic or involving a given type of party; and second, the possibility of vesting the lowestlevel authorities with the power and duty to carry out the commands of higher-level
authorities. In the 1790s, then, commentators explored the possibilities of embracing
concurrent jurisdiction in state and federal courts as well as designating the state courts
essentially as inferior federal courts.
In some sense, these were new issues. As subjects of the British Empire,
Americans had devoted most of their political attention not to institutional arrangements
within a largely agreed-upon system but rather to challenging the fundamental nature of
the system itself. Thus, members of the colonial opposition had cobbled together an
alternative vision that would come to be called “federalism” in their efforts to rebut the
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hegemonic system of empire on which metropolitan authorities insisted.61 Early
republicans, meanwhile, viewed their main task as settling on the mechanisms by which
the new federal system would be maintained – a no less important or potentially
acrimonious dispute, for the system was so new that its structure would in important
respects determine its substance.
In another sense, however, the questions presented similar quandaries to those
that had occupied the colonial opposition since the imperial struggles of the 1760s and
1770s. The crucial issue no longer concerned the nature of sovereignty in a compound
political entity, but the new variable of jurisdiction – Ames’s “authority to judge” – and
its allocation among the United States’ hard-won multiple sovereigns. Perhaps, then, it is
not surprising that early republicans thought about these problems through some of the
same intellectual lenses that had served them during the intra-imperial conflict. As we
will see, when Americans in the 1790s considered how best to arrange their multilayered
authorities, they often returned to familiar notions of imperium in imperio and linedrawing.
A.

Concurrent Jurisdiction; or, Parallel Judicial Tracks.

The idea of concurrent jurisdiction was absolutely central to the early national
efforts to theorize what federalism meant in practice. Yet various observers used the
term in different senses that proceeded from distinct understandings of the appropriate
baseline distribution of authority between the federal government and the states. At
times, “concurrence” seems to have referred to very broad notions of how to manage
multiple sovereigns operating within the same space; at other times, the term referred to a
more finely grained vision of the institutional distribution of authority among various
levels of courts and legislatures. Moreover, contemporaries disagreed regarding the
direction of the sharing of power. Was concurrence in effect when an all-powerful
general government allowed states to exercise some authority over federal issues, as
Alexander Hamilton argued? Or was it the opposite situation, in which a state granted
some of its plenary power to the general government, as Thomas Jefferson maintained?
Although the meaning of concurrence remained contested throughout the early republican
period, the term – and the basic concept of overlapping power – informed theorists on all
sides of the debate.
In the broadest sense, the term “concurrence” referred in this context to a structure
in which multiple levels of government within a single polity possess overlapping
authority to regulate, legislate, or adjudicate. This was the sense in which Hamilton
employed the label in Federalist No. 32. Addressing the Constitution’s grant to Congress
of the power to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” Hamilton reassured
skeptics that the states would nonetheless retain the “independent and uncontrolable [sic]
authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants” – a power that
had been central to the colonies’ claims of independence since the 1760s.62 Because the
61
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Constitution “aims only at a partial Union or consolidation,” Hamilton reasoned, the
states necessarily retained “all of the rights of sovereignty which they before had” and
which were not by the Constitution “exclusively delegated to the United States.”63 The
consequence of such an arrangement would, Hamilton concluded, mean that in certain
areas – such as taxation of “all articles other than exports and imports” – citizens might
be subject to “a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States and in the
individual States.”64 In other words, not all powers associated with the federal
government were vested exclusively in the federal government.
Since the 1760s, the taxation issue had implicated questions about overlapping, or
concurrent, legislative powers. By 1789, however, the debate had shifted to include
concurrent judicial power. Here, too, Publius had something to say. In Federalist No.
82, Hamilton took up the question of the relationship between the state courts and the
federal courts. (Note that at the time that Hamilton was writing, the federal courts
comprised only the Supreme Court; however, Hamilton’s references to “the national
tribunals” suggests that he, like many of his contemporaries, assumed that the First
Congress would indeed establish inferior federal courts.65) Here again, Hamilton was
sanguine about the prospects for concurrent jurisdiction. Reading Article III, section 1 as
a nonexclusive description of the “organs” through which the federal judicial power was
to be exercised, Hamilton argued that the states retained jurisdiction “of causes of which
the state courts have previous cognizance.”66 This concurrence did not extend, however,
to “cases which may grow out of, and be peculiar to the constitution to be established.”67
The guiding principle for Hamilton, then, was that the state courts might permissibly hear
cases “arising under the laws of the union,” as long as the Constitution or an act of
Congress did not expressly commit that class of case to the federal courts.68
Hamilton’s justifications for this concurrent judicial power are interesting because
they represent a subtle but important shift from some Americans’ pre-Revolutionary
vision of the proper allocation of authority in a federal government. Beginning in the
1760s, colonists had objected to increased taxation and regulation by Parliament based on
their belief that such measures violated what they regarded as the essential structure of
the imperial union. That structure, the colonists argued, did not depend on the territorybased view of authority on which metropolitan officials insisted, and which maintained
that the colonies were integrated into the British dominions and therefore subject to the
full range of regulation by Parliament. Rather, Anglo-Americans argued for a subject63
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matter conception of political and legal power that allocated jurisdiction among multiple
governmental actors (in their case, between Parliament and the colonies’ own
assemblies), depending on the particular thing or activity to be regulated. 69
In the colonists’ view, this subject-matter approach to authority meant that certain
types of issues were the exclusive province of colonial governments and were therefore
beyond the power of Parliament (and, in some cases, the Crown) to regulate. Provincial
spokespeople denominated these areas of exclusively local regulation variously as
“internal” (as opposed to “external”), “special,” or “domestic,” or as related to locally
raised “revenue” that they believed ought to be reinvested locally rather than disbursed
into the general accounts of the realm. During the Stamp Act crisis and the ensuing,
decade-long cycle of parliamentary legislation and colonial outrage, commentators such
as Richard Bland of Virginia put the matter increasingly bluntly. For purposes of
external government, Bland acknowledged, “we are and must be subject to the authority
of the British Parliament.” With respect to internal government, however, Bland
contended that “any tax respecting our INTERNAL polity which may hereafter be
imposed on us by act of Parliament is arbitrary, as depriving us of our rights, and may be
opposed.” On this basis, Bland argued, “[T]he legislature of the colony have a right to
enact ANY law they shall think necessary for their INTERNAL government.”70 By
1773, members of the Massachusetts assembly were invoking Continental theorists such
as Samuel von Pufendorf to support their demands to be treated as coequal entities in a
system of states, with a concomitant degree of legislative autonomy within its defined
sphere.71 On the eve of the Revolution, then, American commentators increasingly
advocated a governmental architecture that comprised multiple sources of lawmaking
authority operating largely in parallel, with each responsible for a specific category of
subjects. As a report of the upper house of the Massachusetts assembly described the
relationship between that body and Parliament in 1773, “[T]he two Powers are not
incompatible, and do subsist together, each restraining its Acts to their Constitutional
Objects.”72
As these comments demonstrate, much prewar Anglo-American thinking about
the nature of authority within a compound government centered on what contemporaries
viewed as the absolute necessity of setting boundaries between the respective levels of
government. Delineation was the order of the day, and a transatlantic obsession with
drawing lines – and, indeed, with the rhetoric of line-drawing – took hold. The royal
governor of Massachusetts, Thomas Hutchinson, declared in 1773, “I know of no Line
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that can be drawn between the supreme Authority of Parliament and the total
Independence of the Colonies: it is impossible there should be two independent
Legislatures in one and the same State . . . .”73 A pseudonymous writer in the BostonGazette and Country Journal took a different view, stating, “NO Line can be drawn
between the usurped Power of Parliament, and a State of Slavery in the Colonies.”74
Advocates of metropolitan supremacy tended to argue for what might be considered a
measure of concurrence, insofar as they were willing to permit colonial assemblies to act
as subordinate and dependent municipal bodies. Members of the colonial opposition, by
contrast, rejected concurrence because they viewed it as a tool of continued metropolitan
dominance. The only workable scenario by which the colonies could remain in the
empire, they believed, was for provincial and central legislatures to operate along distinct
and nonintersecting lines.
By embracing concurrent powers as a natural consequence of the Constitution’s
structure, Hamilton implied that this strict demarcation along subject-matter lines might
not be relevant to the new republic. Indeed, his formulation of the jurisdiction question
referred not at all to the separation of authority that had obtained within the British
Empire. Rather, his description of those powers suggested a certain degree of ambiguity,
at least with respect to concurrent state- and federal-court jurisdiction. State courts might
permissibly take cognizance of cases arising under federal law, Hamilton stated, as long
as the state had jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. “The judiciary power of
every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays
hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction though the causes
of dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of that globe,” he wrote in
Federalist No. 82. “Those of Japan not less than of New-York may furnish the objects of
legal discussion to our courts.”75
According to this line of analysis, subject matter was irrelevant; the only pertinent
consideration for a court was whether the parties were physically within its jurisdiction.
Such a regime would necessarily lead to overlaps and would therefore run afoul of the
parallelism principle articulated by prewar colonial commentators.76 Yet Hamilton took a
slightly different approach when he argued that the Supreme Court would necessarily
possess appellate jurisdiction over state-court cases involving federal law. “The objects
of appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone contemplated” when
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determining whether a case was eligible for appeal to the Supreme Court, Hamilton
wrote. Here, then, the relevant criterion was that the case arose under the law of the
United States, not the largely happenstance fact of the geographic location in which it
originated. Subject-matter questions were thus largely irrelevant to Hamilton for
purposes of expanding state-court jurisdiction to include federal causes of action, but they
were dispositive in determining the scope of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction.
The interest in exploring at least the possibility of concurrence as a basis for the
federal republic therefore set the constitutional debates of the ratification and early
republican periods apart from those of the 1760s and 1770s. Whereas many colonists had
resisted concurrence and pressed for subject-matter-specific boundaries between local
and metropolitan authorities, Hamilton and other commentators in 1787 treated
overlapping boundaries between states and federal government as a potential means of
granting a measure of power to the states. This may seem counterintuitive; after all, the
colonists viewed concurrence not as an opportunity to stake their claim to a piece of the
larger government but as a transfer of power back to Westminster. How, then, could
Hamilton present concurrence as an acknowledgment of the states’ “primitive
jurisdiction”?77 Consider again his statement in Federalist No. 32: “the plan of the
Convention aims only at a partial Union or consolidation,” and therefore “the State
Governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had and
which were not by that act exclusively delegated to the United States.”78 In a world such
as that of the 1760s and 1770s, where the central controversy concerned not membership
and control of a central government but independence from that government, concurrence
provided a means for the center to overreach itself and exert power over the provinces.
But perhaps in a world such as that of 1787, where complete union or consolidation
appeared to be a possibility, retaining concurrent jurisdiction might reasonably be
construed as a victory for the states.79
Still, one important difference between the colonial and early republican
discussions of concurrence was the institutional focus of each. Whereas the colonists
devoted themselves to analyzing competing legislative claims to power (the provincial
assemblies versus Parliament), commentators in the ratification period and afterward
increasingly emphasized the judicial side of concurrence. Hamilton’s analysis in The
Federalist contemplated both species of concurrence. Increasingly after 1789, however,
the drive to establish the inferior federal courts shifted the emphasis of structural
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discussions away from issues of legislative competition, with their colonial resonance,
and toward the new problem of organizing multiple judiciaries within a single
overarching polity. The advent of the lower federal courts added a new urgency to this
inquiry. Thus, by 1803, Virginia jurist St. George Tucker could observe that the “grand
boundary” that “mark[ed] the obvious limits between the federal and state jurisdictions”
coexisted with “some few cases, where, by a special provision contained in the
constitution either concurrent, or exclusive, jurisdiction is granted to the federal
government.”80 Notably, in contrast to Hamilton’s view, Tucker’s vision of concurrence
amounted to a special invitation to the federal courts, not the state courts, to take
jurisdiction over a select group of cases. The two theorists thus differed in their default
assumptions as to which level of courts was the norm and which the exception, but they
both presented some degree of judicial concurrency as necessary to the larger federal
system.
But the fact that concurrence was a frequent topic of discussion in the ratification
period does not mean that contemporaries had uniformly warm regard for it. Some
observers opposed any form of concurrence, believing that any overlap between the state
and federal judiciaries would only lead to confusion and either centralization or
disintegration, depending on the observer’s particular array of anxieties about federalism.
Virginia judge Joseph Jones wrote to Madison in July 1789 to note his discomfort with
the draft judiciary bill, which he believed muddied rather than clarified the relationships
among the various courts. “[T]he different powers and jurisdictions of the Courts would
have been more clearly seen had they been taken up in several bills, each describing the
province and boundary of the Court to which it particularly applied,” he observed. But
his objections extended beyond the form of the bill. To Jones, even the act’s few
references to the state courts (i.e., section 9’s language regarding concurrent jurisdiction
to state courts for cases involving tort claims by aliens in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty and section 25’s provision regarding appeals to the Supreme Court) obscured
the true scope of the federal courts’ reach. “[W]here there is danger of clashing
jurisdictions, the limits should be defined as acurately [sic] as may be, and this danger
will exist where there are concurrent jurisdictions,” Jones contended.81 Congressman
John Brown, who represented the Kentucky district of Virginia, sounded a similar note of
caution, describing his fear that “great difficulties will arise from the concurrent
Jurisdiction of the Federal with the State Court, which will unavoidably occasion great
embarrassment & clashing.” Brown followed this statement with a guarded endorsement
of the act, however, calling it “as good I believe as we at present could make it.”82
Edmund Randolph’s 1790 plan to amend the 1789 act, meanwhile, offered
reforms while also attempting to correct some of the act’s ambiguities concerning
concurrence. As has been noted, the attorney general’s proposals failed to gain sufficient
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support to be adopted. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the ways in which observers were
working to reconceptualize and reconfigure jurisdiction in the years following the
passage of the 1789 act. Randolph’s scheme offered several significant changes to the
structure erected by the act. First, the plan whittled away the states’ jurisdiction over
nominally federal matters to such a degree that concurrent authority was rendered
virtually nonexistent. As Maeva Marcus notes, Randolph’s “central premise” was that
“federal and state jurisdictions should be completely separate.”83 From this premise
followed a much more sweeping grant of authority to the district and circuit courts as
well as language that explicitly stripped the state courts of the power to take cognizance
of several of the most common federal causes of action.
The plan’s broad grant to the inferior federal courts included original jurisdiction
“of all cases in law and equity, arising . . . [under] the Constitution of the United States . .
. [t]he laws of the United States . . . and [t]reaties made, or which shall be made under
their authority.”84 In other words, Randolph sought to vest the lower federal courts with
the full range of original jurisdiction under Article III – that is, general federal question
jurisdiction.85 State courts, meanwhile, were expressly prohibited from hearing a number
types of of cases, including admiralty and maritime cases, cases in which the United
States or a particular state was a defendant (except in cases of consent by the state), cases
involving land grants by different states, treason cases, federal criminal cases (absent a
specific congressional provision establishing state courts’ jurisdiction), and cases
involving congressionally created rights with federal remedies.86 Moreover, an apparent
narrowing of the Supreme Court’s power to review state-court decisions accompanied
this expansion of the lower federal courts’ jurisdiction, although the precise contours of
the restriction are not entirely clear.87
Randolph’s proposals appear to have confounded his contemporaries. Alfred
Moore, a future justice of the Supreme Court, remarked to North Carolina senator Samuel
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Johnston that “there appears an utter confusion in Mr Attorney’s Ideas,” noting in
particular the apparent conflict between Randolph’s claim that “the State Courts ought to
be excluded because not under the Control of the federal Courts” and his claim that the
state courts’ proceedings “are in some instances subject to the federal Judiciary, because
that Judiciary must ex natura rei control determinations that counteract the operation of
the Constitution.”88
Despite these apparent ambiguities, Randolph’s plan is important because it
demonstrates the degree to which the scope and nature of federal jurisdiction remained a
contested issue in the 1790s. Furthermore, the proposal clearly shows Randolph
endorsing an expanded vision of “arising under” jurisdiction at the same time that he was
struggling to articulate clearer boundaries between federal and state courts than those set
forth in the 1789 act.89 In this way, Randolph’s plan eschewed the relatively welcoming
attitude toward concurrent jurisdiction that Hamilton had adopted in his Federalist
essays, moving instead toward a notion of the judicial power of the United States as
something extraordinary and perhaps beyond the ken of state courts.
Of course, Randolph’s plan did not mandate that cases arising under the laws of
the United States fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of the federal courts; the report
merely stated that the lower federal courts possessed original jurisdiction over such cases.
This capacious view of the federal judicial power, however, hearkened to the subjectmatter-driven analyses of the 1760s and 1770s, insofar as it looked not to the nature of
the parties or the jurisdiction in which their case arose but rather to the character of the
claim at issue. Randolph’s conception thus also represented a shift away from the 1789
act’s focus on the parties’ identity or location, and toward the underlying subject of the
cause of action as decisive of jurisdiction.90 In other words, the jurisdictional lines drawn
by the attorney general resembled the prewar notion of sovereignty as attaching to
specific subjects of regulation.
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B.

States Courts as Federal Courts; or, Deputizing the States.

In addition to contemplating concurrent arrangements, in which the judicial
powers of the federal and state governments overlapped, some theorists in the 1790s
considered whether the state courts could themselves be integrated into the emerging
judicial structure. In this scenario, the state courts would in effect function as inferior
federal courts. The idea had circulated since the Philadelphia and ratifying conventions;
after all, the language of the Supremacy Clause singled out “the Judges in every State” to
be bound by “the supreme Law of the Land.”91 Because the state courts were thus
already obliged to follow and enforce the laws of the United States, the argument ran,
inferior federal courts were not necessary to the constitutional structure; on the contrary,
Congress could permissibly refrain from establishing such courts altogether.92
Such an argument appealed especially to Antifederalists who worried that the
creation of inferior federal courts amounted to the thin edge of the nationalizing wedge,
intruding and encroaching on the reserved powers of the states. Indeed, outspoken critics
of broad national power such as Luther Martin had initially supported the Supremacy
Clause precisely because they believed that its reliance on state courts threatened less
intrusion on state prerogatives than did the federal negative.93 “[W]hat is there left to the
State Courts?,” George Mason inquired of his colleagues in the Virginia ratifying
convention as they debated Article I’s grant to Congress of the power to establish inferior
federal courts. “When we consider the nature of these Courts, we must conclude, that
their effect and operation will be utterly to destroy the State Governments. . . . The
discrimination between their Judicial power and that of the States, exists therefore but in
name.”94 For Mason and others who advocated a general government with circumscribed
powers, the prospect of swelling ranks of federal courts – with concomitant growth in
claims of federal jurisdiction – threatened nothing less than “the annihilation of the state
judiciaries.”95
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In the 1790s, following ratification, some commentators continued to make the
case for relying on state courts to conduct the first level of federal judicial business.
“[T]he whole judicial system is a giddy profusion, and quite unnecessary,” lamented the
pseudonymous “Rusticus” in Boston’s Independent Chronicle.
The business might have been done in the State Courts, with a
balance or check, raised by giving a Court of the Union, power to
examine and correct those cases where foreigners or persons of
different States are concerned. And all this unweildy [sic] and
useless machinery of Circuit, District and Supreme Courts might
have been omitted.96
Such criticisms briefly gained momentum in March 1791, when New York
congressman Egbert Benson introduced a set of amendments to Article III that echoed
Rusticus’s sentiments. The centerpiece of Benson’s plan was a provision requiring
Congress to establish in each state a “General Judicial Court,” either by denominating the
highest existing state court as such or by creating a new court. The general judicial court,
which was to be “regulated as the Congress shall prescribe,” would have original
jurisdiction “in all cases to which the judicial power of the United States doth extend,” as
well as appellate jurisdiction over cases from other courts within the state.97 Moreover,
although the judges of this new court would receive their salaries from the federal
government and be subject to the good behavior standard, they could be impeached by
either the House of Representatives or the state legislature. Judges from state courts that
were declared general judicial courts by Congress would become judges of the new
courts “by force of their appointments” as state-court judges, and the powers and duties
of the state court would “devolve on the judges of the general judicial court.”98 The plan
concluded with an explicit statement of the new courts’ dual nature: state judicial officers
would be “held to execute their respective offices for carrying into effect the laws of the
United States” as well as in addition to the duties assigned to them by the laws of the
state.”99 Benson’s amendments thus shunted aside fine distinctions relating to
concurrence between state and federal courts and instead essentially deputized the state
courts to serve Congress and the federal judicial power.
Although the Benson proposal received widespread attention in the press, it too
was dispatched to committee and never heard from again.100 Despite this ignominious
fate, Benson’s amendments highlight a tension in the arguments for increased reliance on
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state courts. The arguments of anti-consolidationists such as Martin and Mason could
easily slide into plans such as Benson’s; putative goals of state autonomy might quickly
give way to schemes to subordinate the states into mere departments, administrative
subdivisions of the general government. State courts might be able to hear diversity
cases, cases involving congressional statutes, treaties, and other federal causes in the first
instance, but would not such an arrangement amount to the state courts’ becoming
coopted by the general government rather than maintaining their prized autonomy? Some
commentators, such as one writing under the nom de plume “Curtius,” expressed
suspicion along these lines in considering the Benson amendments and similar plans:
[O]n taking a candid and impartial survey of the amendments in
question, it is obvious that the sole scope and intention of them is
to absorbe [sic] and annihilate those very governments, to which
the general one owes its existence; or at best, to convert them into
extensive but feeble CORPORATIONS.101
Throughout the 1780s and 1790s, observers with a wide array of agendas and
commitments argued that the state courts ought to have an institutional place in the new
federal edifice. Some hoped that the state courts, as already-extant and functioning
adjudicatory bodies, could be folded directly into the federal apparatus. Others wanted
robust state judiciaries to act as buffers against what they viewed as the creeping
expansion of federal question jurisdiction (and, with it, the homogenizing, centralizing
force of union). Opponents of a broader brief for the state courts, however, offered a
wide array of arguments against further incorporating them into the federal structure.
While some of these critics hoped that the state courts might for their own protection be
cordoned off from the federal judiciary, others argued that the state courts must be kept
out because they were untrustworthy and might corrupt the federal system.
Taking the former, protective view of state courts, Pennsylvania congressman
William Maclay suggested that the states were already implicated in the federal structure,
whether they liked it or (as in his case) not. Just as the Constitution had “meant to
swallow up all the state Constitutions by degrees,” he insisted, the 1789 act aimed to
“Swallow by degrees all the State Judiciaries.”102 Despite his role as a member of the
committee that had drafted the 1789 act, Maclay ultimately could not bring himself to
vote for the act, which he called “a Vile law System, calculated for Expence, and with a
design to draw by degrees all law business into the federal Courts.”103
Federalist Fisher Ames of Massachusetts had different concerns, however. Ames
contended that the state courts possessed the power to range freely over the full landscape
of both federal and state matters. But how, if at all, Ames wondered, could the state
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courts ever be checked? Vesting state courts with any significant jurisdiction over
federal questions risked profound problems of representation, insofar as it lodged
decisionmaking power in officials whose allegiance was only to their local community,
not the interests of the Union as a whole. “Will the state judges act quasi state judges or
as federal[?]” Ames inquired. “If as state judges, how can you add duties not required by
the states who commissioned them and how can you compel them to perform such duties,
or punish for the violation or neglect.”104 Furthermore, Ames wondered, would one even
be able to determine in what capacity a state judge was acting in any given moment?
“The jurisdictions being concurrent, how will you distinguish when they act as state, and
when as federal judges __ sometimes a nice question this.”105
The map created by the 1789 act expressed this prevailing uncertainty as to how
the state courts ought to be treated. The act’s structure not only accepted the states as
preexisting polities but actually overlaid the new federal districts onto the existing map of
the states – even borrowing the states’ names. Thus, the districts described in the act
comprised “one to consist of the State of Connecticut, and to be called Connecticut
District; one to consist of the State of New York, and to be called New York District,”
and so forth through the other nine states and two subsets of states (Maine and
Kentucky).106 This overlap between the state and federal maps appears not to have raised
significant objections during the debates on the act. Notably, an amendment to breach
state boundaries by creating a multi-state district covering portions of Maryland,
Virginia, and Delaware failed in the House, suggesting that maintaining the states’
territorial integrity – rather than drawing entirely new political boundaries solely for
federal purposes – was important to members.107
Was this political and legal congruence evidence of the federal government’s
desire to press the states into its service, or was it an acknowledgment of the states’
importance, perhaps even a sign of respect? Many contemporaries regarded the layout of
the districts, and their number, as an attempt to ensure that the judicial power of the
United States could be felt throughout the nation while also establishing it as superior to
the judiciary of any one state.108 During the 1790s, however, many observers complained
that the seats of federal government within any given state were too remote. One
commentator suggested that the upshot of this arrangement – which created, in the words
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of Julius Goebel, “a species of artificial federal entity”– was confusion leavened with a
lack of popular identification with the federal government.109 “The laws of the United
States, coming into discussion only in one court in each state, are but little known, and, at
a distance from that court they are considered as foreign laws,” lamented “A Citizen” in
the Washington Federalist. “The contrast between the state and the federal
administration of justice appears strong, and the advantage manifest against the federal
judiciary.”110 Thus, despite efforts by Randolph and others to keep separate the multiple
levels of judicial power, the complexities of concurrence – both of subject matter and of
territorial space – were very much on commentators’ minds throughout the 1790s.
Here was another respect in which the debates of the post-ratification period
echoed the arguments of the 1760s and 1770s: commentators in the early Republic
employed a similar vocabulary of line-drawing and imperium in imperio to that of their
predecessors a few decades earlier. Even as they experimented with concurrence and
considered deputizing state courts to act as inferior federal courts, early republican
theorists continued to think about governmental structure in terms of the boundaries
between different sovereigns and different sources of authority. The drive to delineate
governmental spheres had preoccupied Thomas Hutchinson and the members of Boston’s
colonial opposition in 1773, and it continued to needle Americans in the post-ratification
period.
The urgency was even more profound in the later years, as “the judicial” (as
Ames and others termed it) increasingly became the institutional site for hashing out the
competing versions of federalism that had emerged since the 1760s.111 In this anxious
context, the old tropes of sovereignty gained new force and meaning. During the 1789
debates, William Paterson conjured up the imperium in imperio specter: “We are a
Combination of Republics __ a number of free States confederated together, & forming a
social League.” Within this league, Paterson went on, the Union and each of the several
states possessed “a Head __ each operating upon different Objects.”112 Given such an
arrangement, could the state courts reach outside the state realm to take cognizance of
federal causes of action? No, Paterson answered. Granting federal authority to judges
“chosen by the respective States; in whose Election the Union has no Voice, and over
whom they have little or no Control” was nothing less than “a Solecism in Politicks – a
Novelty in Govt.”113 By 1791, Massachusetts Federalist Theodore Sedgwick was
bemoaning the problems that “arise from an administration of justice by two distinct &
independent sovereignties over the same persons, in the same place and at the same

109

Goebel, Antecedents and Beginnings at 471 (cited in note 41).

110

“A Citizen,” Washington Federalist, Jan. 26, 1801.

111

See, for example, Ames to Lowell, July 28, 1789, 4 DHSC at 481 (cited in note 32).

112

Id at 414.

113

Id at 415.

29

time.”114 Sedgwick made his observations just a few weeks before Justice James Wilson
wrote to Washington with a proposal for a digest of federal law, observing that “the
difficult and delicate Line of Authority . . . must be run.”115 Born in the provincial
legislatures of a mercantile, transatlantic empire, the vocabulary of federalism found new
salience among the multiple judiciaries of the early Republic.
The ongoing constitutional debates of the 1790s demonstrated the fragile nature
of the definitions of political and legal authority that many Americans believed they had
worked out in the course of the conflict with Britain. Now, conscious of their inheritance
as the second generation since the founding, early republican observers turned anxiously
back to old themes of imperium in imperio, multiple sovereigns, and line-drawing.116 At
the same time, however, they became fascinated with ideas of concurrence – of multiple
and overlapping powers, especially judicial powers.117 These warring impulses gained
intensity throughout the 1790s until, fueled by partisan rancor that few in the first
generation had anticipated, they exploded in the tumults of 1800 and 1801.

III.

From federal to Federal Judicial Power: The Judiciary Act of 1801.

As the preceding discussion has suggested, beginning in 1789, judicial power
emerged as the focus of both practical and theoretical disputes about the nature of
multilayered authority. The judiciary became the key site of federalism during this
period, with jurisdiction as the tool by which theorists and politicians carved up the levels
of power among governments and people.
That was the scene in 1789 and for much of the subsequent decade. Around
1800, however, that picture changed. From the domain of federalism in the 1780s and
1790s, judicial power became the redoubt of Federalism in the 1800s. The story of the
presidential election (or “revolution,” as Jefferson termed it118) of 1800 is well known, as
is the subsequent rise of the Jeffersonian-Republican party and the eclipse of the
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Federalists.119 A familiar part of this tale is the flight of the Federalists to the judiciary in
the wake of the schism that resulted in the first party system and the “loss” of the
presidency and Congress to the Jeffersonians.120
This story, however, often treats the Judiciary Act of 1801 as an artifact of the
election of 1800, a manifestation of partisan rancor with little to tell us about
constitutional thought. Hence the emphasis, as suggested in the quotation from Kathryn
Turner Preyer above, on the judiciary act’s passage in 1801 as a mere prelude to its repeal
in 1802.121 But there is more to the 1801 act than this narrative of Federalist
overreaching and Republican chastisement suggests. Like the 1789 act, the 1801 act
should be viewed not simply from the modern perspective of the forward march of the
federal courts to the twenty-first century, but rather from the early republican angle of
making divided government work. To be sure, party politics are central to this account;
as Joanne Freeman points out, a “crisis mentality” had seized the American political
scene by 1800, stemming in large part by the hardening of party lines in a time when
“normalcy” was understood as “the absence of organized national parties, not a wellfunctioning national party system.”122 But more was at issue in the 1801 act than the
partitioning of the federal empire between Federalist and Republican claimants to rule.
Ideas were at stake in the debates surrounding the 1801 act, just as they had been in 1789.
The turn-of-the-century constitutional struggle was not merely a cover for partisan
conflict; to interpret the period in that light does a disservice to the depth of the beliefs at
issue. Such an interpretation also falls prey to the temptation to paint the 1790s as the fall
from grace, the sullied and sordid aftermath of the edenic moment of 1787-1789.
Certainly, the rancor of the 1790s was real; the allegiances had hardened, and the threat
that ongoing warfare in Europe would engulf the United States added a new level of
global consequence to the continuing uncertainty about the Republic’s future. And I do
not mean to suggest that politics and ideas are separate categories, with “mere” politics
bearing no relationship to the realm of ideas. My point is that the partisan din of the
1790s should not trick jaded modern observers into thinking that the source of the
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conflict was political gain or power alone.123 Rather, the source of the conflict was
political gain and power, as well as ongoing and fundamental disagreement about just
what the “federal” in “federal republic” was to mean, and what role the judiciary would
play in that federal republic.
The debates that culminated in the passage and repeal of the 1801 act demonstrate
the degree to which early-nineteenth-century theories of jurisdiction took on the full
weight of the sovereignty discourse of the eighteenth century, transforming questions of
political authority in the broadest sense into issues of judicial power and the degree to
which the federal and state systems would or would not overlap. By 1801, jurisdiction
had replaced sovereignty as the lodestar of American constitutional debate. The 1801 act
thus continued the 1789 act’s project of adjusting federal judicial structure as a means of
adjusting the structure of federalism – the relationship between the states and the general
government – itself.
Yet many of the premises underpinning the 1801 act differed markedly from those
that informed the 1789 act. One crucial difference concerned the scope of the federal
judicial power in the respective acts. As we have seen, the 1789 act took a cautious, even
conciliatory, approach to the states’ claims to jurisdiction. For example, the federal
districts replicated the boundaries of the states rather than asserting new districts that
swallowed or subdivided the states; in addition, supporters of the act pointed to its
acknowledgment of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction as evidence that the lower
federal courts were not intended to supplant the state courts. The drafters of the 1801 act,
in contrast, spent little time reassuring the states and instead presented a significantly
more robust federal judiciary – both in terms of the number of courts and in the nature of
their jurisdiction – with the potential for far greater intrusion into the states. The 1801
act, in other words, combined the colonial impulse to draw lines between levels of
authority with the ratification era’s focus on the judiciary as the principal axis of that
division.
A.

Debating the Judiciary Act of 1801.

Throughout the 1790s, Congress engaged in relatively modest reforms of the
federal judiciary, despite complaints from many quarters regarding the 1789 act. The
chief criticism centered on the requirement that Supreme Court justices ride circuit,
which meant not only fatigue for the justices but also occasional conflicts insofar as a
given justice might hear the same case twice, once at the circuit level and once in the
Supreme Court.124 Following John Adams’s December 1799 address to Congress, the
members of the Sixth Congress began to consider a comprehensive overhaul. In his
address, the president insisted that “a revision and amendment of the judicial system” was
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“indispensably necessary” to “give due effect to the civil administration of Government,
and to ensure a just execution of the laws.”125 Congress appeared to take Adams’s
recommendation seriously. In February 1800, a House committee met with justices
William Paterson and Bushrod Washington to receive their recommendations for reform.
The committee comprised five members, all Federalists: Robert Goodloe Harper of South
Carolina; Chauncey Goodrich of Connecticut; James A. Bayard of Delaware, Samuel
Sewall of Massachusetts, and John Marshall of Virginia.126 Shortly thereafter, on March
11, Harper introduced the committee’s draft bill to the House.
The centerpiece of the Harper bill, as it was known, was a proposal to increase the
number of federal judicial districts from thirteen to thirty, and the circuit courts from
three to nine.127 As these numbers suggest, the districts in the Harper bill did not
conform to state boundaries; instead, most states were divided into multiple districts. The
bill also proposed new names for the districts, given that they could no longer share
nomenclature with the state with which they overlapped. The counties of Essex, Suffolk,
Norfolk, Middlesex, Bristol, Plymouth, Barnstable, Duke, and Nantucket in
Massachusetts were to constitute the district of Boston. The remaining Massachusetts
counties (Berkshire, Hampshire, Worcester), meanwhile, would be combined into the
district of Warranoch. Virginia’s counties were to be divided among the Potowmac,
Fluvanna, Kenhawa districts. Rhode Island would not be divided but would constitute
the district of Narragansett; similarly, Vermont would constitute the single district of
Champlain, although Connecticut’s district would be called Connecticut.128 As for the
nine circuits, each was described according to the districts it comprised:
The first circuit shall consist of the districts of Kennebeck, Merrimac,
Boston, and Narragansett; the second, of the districts of Connecticut,
Warranock [sic], and Champlain; the third, of the districts of Hudson,
Saratoga, and Ontario; the fourth, of the districts of Rariton, Schuylkill,
Delware, and Choptank; the fifth, of the districts of Chesapeake,
Susquehanna, and Alleganey; the sixth, of the districts of Potomac [sic],
Fluvannah [sic], and Kenhawa; the seventh, of the districts of Pamplico,
Catawba, and Saluda; the eight, of the districts of Santee, Alatamaha, and
Savannah; and the ninth, of the districts of Holston, Cumberland, Ohio,
and Rockcastle.129
Besides this realignment of the districts and circuits, the bill proposed to expand the
circuit courts’ jurisdiction over several types of cases, including “all actions and suits,
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matters or things, cognizable by the judicial authority of the United States, under and by
virtue of the constitution thereof,” as long as the amount in question was at least one
hundred dollars and exclusive jurisdiction was not already vested in the Supreme Court
by the Constitution or in the admiralty courts pursuant to the new bill.130
Despite the committee’s efforts (including John Marshall’s “lengthy defence of
the new system” on the floor of the House), the Harper bill immediately stirred enormous
controversy both inside and outside Congress.131 Much of the criticism focused on the
provision to increase and rearrange the district courts. Georgia senator Abraham
Baldwin, writing to his brother-in-law Joel Barlow (then the American ambassador to
Algiers), characterized the Harper bill as intended “to new model the judiciary” and
called it “a very broad stroke to draw all the powers to the general government and to do
away as far as possible not only state powers, but even boundaries.”132 The Philadelphia
Aurora, meanwhile, lambasted the reorganization of the districts, chortling, “instead of
calling Jersey by that name the district is to be denominated (alamode de Paris) the
department or district of Rariton, and so on throughout the United States!”133 Given the
frequency with which Federalists accused the Aurora and other Republican newspapers
of “jacobin” sympathies, this critique of the Harper bill as carrying out renaming projects
akin to those of revolutionary France’s Committee of Public Safety is particularly
noteworthy. In a letter to his brother John Quincy Adams, U.S. minister to Prussia,
Thomas Boylston Adams despaired of such suspicions but expressed some of his own.
“[T]here is an evident reluctance in many gentlemen towards these great national acts,
because they tend to strengthen the bonds of union & give an influence to the general
Government, that interferes with their malignant designs,” the president’s younger son
wrote.134
Facing this opposition, on March 31 Harper introduced an amended bill in which
the number of districts was reduced to 19 and the circuits to six. In the amended bill, the
names and boundaries of the district courts followed the names and boundaries of the
states (with the exceptions of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and
Tennessee, each of which was divided into two districts). This scaling-back of the
federal courts’ presence was accompanied, however, by an extension of their
jurisdiction.135 Pursuant to the amended bill, the circuit courts’ jurisdiction would
encompass “all cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and laws of the
United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”136 The
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scope of this grant stood in sharp contrast to the 1789 act’s grant of original jurisdiction
to the circuit courts in, first, “all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity” in
which the amount in controversy is at least five hundred dollars, and the United States is
a plaintiff or petitioner, or an alien is a party; and second, diversity suits.137 The amended
bill’s jurisdictional grant was not as broad as that of the original Harper bill, however,
which as we have seen proposed expanding the scope of federal jurisdiction to “all
actions and suits, matters or things, cognizable by the judicial authority of the United
States, under and by virtue of the constitution thereof” – that is, to the full extent of
judicial power under Article III.138
The amended bill made little progress in the first session of the Sixth Congress.
In the second session, however, a new committee – including some Republicans – took
up the judiciary question again and presented a substantially similar bill to the full
House.139 At the beginning of the session, Adams had again pressed for judicial reform
in a speech to Congress that Marshall – now secretary of state – had helped prepare.140
Following some discussion of the propriety of permitting state courts to exercise
jurisdiction over federal cases, the bill passed the House on January 20, 1801, and the
Senate on February 7. Titled “An Act to provide for the more convenient organization of
the Courts of the United States,” the bill became law upon receiving Adams’s signature
on February 13. The final form of the provision regarding the circuit courts’ original
jurisdiction closely tracked the language of the amended Harper bill. Section 11 of the
act provided “[t]hat the said circuit courts respectively shall have cognizance . . . of all
cases in law or equity, arising under the constitution and laws of the United States, and
treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority.”141 In addition, the act
provided for easier removal of cases from state to federal court.142 Four days after the
law’s enactment, on February 17, the House finally settled the disputed presidential
election by electing Jefferson on the thirty-sixth ballot.
As this chronology demonstrates, and as several scholars have noted, the
movement that led to the Judiciary Act of 1801 predated the election of 1800 by several
months. Thus, as Preyer notes, “the Act was clearly not occasioned by the Republican
victory in 1800.”143 Indeed, commentators on both sides of the partisan divide had
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anticipated an attempted expansion of the federal judicial power for some time before the
1801 act came to pass. In August 1799, Jefferson had confided his fears about the
expansion of the federal government – in particular, the federal judiciary – in a letter to
Edmund Randolph. Specifically, Jefferson worried that the growth of federal courts’
jurisdiction would lead to a body of federal common law separate from state law that
would become a tool of federal oppression. Jefferson’s use of pronouns to refer to the
government – and thus to the Federalists – is particularly illuminating:
Of all the doctrines which have ever been broached by the federal
government, the novel one, of the common law being in force &
cognizable as an existing law in their courts, is to me the most
formidable. All their other assumptions of un-given powers have
been in the detail. The bank law, the treaty doctrine, the sedition
act, alien act . . . &c., &c., have been solitary, unconsequential,
timid things, in comparison with the audacious, bare-faced and
sweeping pretension to a system of law for the U S, without the
adoption of their legislature, and so infinitely beyond their power
to adopt.144
For Jefferson, jurisdiction was a mere cover for the spread of substantive federal law,
objectionable not only because it could potentially serve as an agent of nationalization
but also – and perhaps more important – because such a body of law could not be
checked by the people in the states.
Jefferson’s democratic critique of the trend toward broader federal jurisdiction
finds an echo in the writings of some leading Federalists, who harbored similar but
differently directed concerns about the relationship between the people and the federal
government. In contrast to Jefferson’s claim that the general government was covertly
absorbing the powers of the states, and therefore of the people, Federalists such as
Hamilton and Sedgwick envisioned the spread of federal power as conducive both to the
public good and, not incidentally, to the power of the current government. “An accurate
view of the internal situation of the UStates presents many discouraging reflections to the
enlightened friends of our Government and country,” Hamilton lamented in October
1799.145 Despite the “instructive comments afforded by the disastrous & disgusting
scenes of the french Revolution,” he observed that “sentiments dangerous to social
happiness have not been diminished.”146 Given this situation, “vigorous measures of
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counteraction” were required of the friends of the government, including the “Extension
of the Judiciary system” by dividing each state into smaller districts and appointing
federal justices of the peace in local areas.147 Sedgwick recommended a similar program
of extending federal power further into the states. “If the real federal majority can act
together much may and ought to be done to give efficiency to the government, and to
repress the efforts of the Jacobins against it,” he wrote to Rufus King. “We ought to
spread out the judicial so as to render the justice of the nation acceptable to the people, to
aid national economy, to overawe the licentious, and to punish the guilty.”148 And, like
Hamilton, Sedgwick noted that these lofty goals also offered more immediate benefits:
“[W]e ought, at the same time, that we promote the real happiness & welfare of the
people, to court thereby their favor.”149
These comments from Hamilton and Sedgwick emphasize the nature of the
Federalists’ program of expanded federal judicial power. In contrast to Hamilton’s
earlier acceptance of concurrent powers when writing as Publius in Federalist 32, by
1799 he was no longer attempting to thread the needled of concurrent power while still
maintaining a forceful general government. Instead, Hamilton – and Sedgwick as well –
embraced a vision of federal power that resembled the one that Randolph had struggled to
articulate in his report of 1790. That vision in turn owed a debt to the opposition theories
that colonists had deployed against parliamentary power in the 1760s and 1770s,
according to which each level of the composite imperial government would possess the
authority to regulate a defined set of subjects. Common to these early approaches and the
views of Hamilton, Sedgwick, and others in the 1790s and 1800s was a belief that the
federal and state governments would operate best as parallel powers, each with its own
area of competence, with little concurrence or crossover. A decade earlier, however, as
we have seen, many commentators had emphasized the opposite, insisting that concurrent
powers of legislation as well as adjudication were inevitable and perhaps even desirable
in the new federal republic.
The language of the two judiciary acts illustrates this difference in emphasis.
While the 1789 act makes multiple references to concurrent state- and federal-court
jurisdiction, the only mention of concurrence in the 1801 act concerns the concurrent
jurisdiction of district and circuit courts with respect to bankruptcy proceedings.150
Similarly, contrast the apparatus of inferior federal courts established by the 1789 act
with that of the 1801 act. While the drafters of the 1789 act took pains to make the new
districts track state boundaries as much as possible, thereby avoiding the suggestion that
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the general government was working to subsume the states within its own artificial
boundaries and structures, the drafters of the 1801 act broke the states down into smaller,
more administrable districts, showing little concern for the integrity of the states as they
did so. Indeed, the Harper bill provides an even more striking example of this apparent
lack of respect for state boundaries, selecting regional, geographic, or Indian names for
the districts rather than adopt the titles of the states. Thus, the goal of separating the
levels of government – with the dual effects of undoing past blurring and asserting
national power – increasingly informed the Federalists’ federalizing policy after 1789.
And they viewed the expansion of the federal courts’ general federal question
jurisdiction, which had begun with the Randolph and Harper proposals and culminated in
the “arising under” jurisdiction of the 1801 act, as the key to this separation.
B.

Repeal.

Of course, the Federalists did not long enjoy the fruits of their plan. Upon the
election of Jefferson by the House of Representatives in February 1801, many observers
predicted the course of subsequent events. The events leading up to the repeal of the
Judiciary Act of 1801 are well known and do not require extensive description here.151
The 1801 act was repealed on March 8, 1802, by a repealing act152 that “annulled the
1801 act’s broad grant of federal question jurisdiction and discarded the newly created
circuit courts, forcing the Supreme Court justices again to ride circuit and act as circuit
judges.” 153 In 1803, six days after handing down the decision in Marbury, the Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the repealing act.154
In the waning days of the Adams administration, as the president filled the sixteen
new circuit judgeships that the act had created155, murmurings of repeal had already
begun to surface.156 In his first annual message to Congress, Jefferson said, without
really saying, the obvious. “The Judiciary system of the United States, and especially
that portion of it recently erected, will, of course, present itself to the contemplation of
Congress,” the president said, noting that he had already requested an account of all the
151

On the repeal of the act, see generally George Lee Haskins and Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of
Power: John Marshall, 1801-15 (Macmillan 1981) (especially chapters 4 and 5); Kathryn Turner [Preyer],
The Midnight Judges, 109 U Pa L Rev 494 (1961).
152

“An Act to repeal certain acts respecting the organization of the Courts of the United States; and for
other purposes,” March 8, 1801, 2 Stat. 132.

153

4 DHSC at 294-95 (cited in note 32).

154

Stuart v Laird, 1 Cranch 299 (1803). Despite the repeal, however, at least one case brought pursuant to
the 1801 act’s grant of federal question jurisdiction managed to survive the repeal. See Wythe Holt, The
First Federal Question Case, 3 Law and Hist Rev 169 (1985).
155

These were the so-called “midnight judges.” See Turner [Preyer], The Midnight Judges, 109 U Pa L
Rev at 495 (cited in note 151).

156

See 4 DHSC at 295 (cited in note 32).

38

cases that had been decided since 1789 and of the number of cases that had been pending
when the 1801 act took effect.157 The act of 1801 had established six new circuit courts
and seven new district courts.158 Jefferson and his associates insisted that the Federalists
had erected this apparatus as a means of entrenching their power in the face of popular
opposition.159 In their view, concurrence was not a bone to be thrown – or not – to the
cowering states at the pleasure of a mighty federal government, but quite the opposite: a
gesture of goodwill on the part of the states as they shared a measure of their plenary
power, their sovereignty, with the general government.
Hamilton, writing as “Lucius Crassus” in the New-York Evening Post, sneered at
Jefferson’s attempt to prove that the new courts were unnecessary. “No bad thermometer
of the capacity of our Chief Magistrate for government is furnished by the rule which he
offers for judging of the utility of the Federal Courts,” Hamilton said of Jefferson’s plan
to tally the number of federal-court cases decided as a means of assessing the need for
additional courts. “There is hardly any stronger symptom of a pigmy mind, than a
propensity to allow greater weight to secondary than to primary considerations.”160
Hamilton and his allies contended that expanding the federal judicial power was the best
solution to the problem of multiple authorities, the problem of imperium in imperio, that
had dogged the republic since before its founding. In an address to the New York City
bar shortly before the repeal of the 1801 act, Hamilton warned of the consequences that
he feared would follow. According to a newspaper report,
He declared in the most emphatic manner, that if the bill for the
repeal passed, and the independence of the Judiciary was
destroyed, the constitution was but a shadow, and we should, e’er
long, be divided into separate confederacies, turning our arms
against each.161
“Separate confederacies, turning our arms against each” – the famously eloquent
Hamilton appears to have selected his words carefully to elicit a response from his
audience. But Hamilton’s choice of the language of confederation at this moment reveals
more than simply rhetorical talents. For many observers in the early years of the
nineteenth century, the murky abstraction of Article III’s “judicial power of the United
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States” had taken shape only through the institutions of the courts themselves, and only
through the device of federal jurisdiction. The years between 1789 and 1802 saw a
constant drive to reshape and reconfigure the courts and their jurisdiction, in a period of
institutional transformation that was unique to the judiciary. Interestingly, the early
Republic witnessed few debates of similar scale regarding the meaning and form of the
legislative or executive powers. The language of Article III, combined with the
Madisonian compromise, had deliberately left a lacuna in the constitutional structure. By
choosing not to fill that gap at Philadelphia, the drafters of the Constitution had ensured
that any institution that eventually did fill it would always been seen as provisional, as an
attempt but not necessarily a complete solution. The gap was visible from the beginning
and would remain so, despite contemporaries’ efforts to fill it – with the 1789 act, with
the Harper bills, with the 1801 act, with the 1802 repealing act. In some sense, then, the
judiciary of any particular era might always appear to its contemporaries as nothing more
than “a new wheel . . . introduced into the federal machine to which the union was before
a stranger, and which is not necessary to its genuine motives.”162
IV.

Conclusion.

By 1789, the concept of jurisdiction had become one of the principal contested
terrains of constitutional discourse. Instead of the emphasis on the legislature that had
fascinated colonial and Revolutionary-era commentators, Americans of the ratification
period and the early Republic devoted substantial thought to the structure of the judiciary.
The lines of judicial authority thus replaced sovereignty as the great mystery to be
unraveled by lawyers, politicians, and thinkers. Yet contemporaries’ normative
conception of jurisdiction was not stable throughout the period of the early Republic;
rather, conflicting visions of jurisdiction – specifically, federal-court jurisdiction –
collided and shifted throughout the period between the passage of the Judiciary Act of
1789 and the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801 in 1802.
The 1801 act must be understood not as an outlier but on its own terms, as –
among other things – an attempt by Federalists to install a particular version of small-f
federalism in the Constitution. That small-f federalism built on theories that colonial
commentators had developed beginning in the 1760s, during the struggle with the British
Empire. Colonial spokespeople had argued for a system of divided authority in which
power was allocated along subject-matter lines, allowing for multiple levels of
government to exist in the same system while each exercising a sovereignty defined by
the subject of the regulation in question. In the 1801 act, unlike the 1789 act, Federalists
sought to return to this idea of subject-matter jurisdiction by establishing broad federal
jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and
treaties made under their authority. This subject-matter focus was necessarily limited by
the Supremacy Clause, which explicitly contemplated some interaction between state
judges and federal law and therefore precluded all federal questions from being vested
exclusively in federal courts. Yet the Federalists succeeded briefly, most notably by
broadening “arising under” jurisdiction and easing the requirements for removal of cases
from state to federal court. The election of 1800 and the ensuing repeal of the 1801 act,
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however, spelled the demise of this idea of jurisdiction and the return of the type of
concurrence and overlap that had characterized the system set up by the 1789 act. After
1801, Jeffersonian Americans pulled back from the federal idea that British North
Americans had developed in the imperial crisis of several decades earlier. One of the
main impulses that had driven early American federalism thus faded after 1802. The fate
of Federalism, therefore, fundamentally altered the landscape of federalism.
My goal has in some sense been to bring the 1801 act back into the mainstream of
American constitutional history. Admittedly, this is something of a difficult task, owing
to the act’s truncated lifespan and to scholars’ tendency to treat it as an anomaly, the
result of a sudden burst of partisan fervor that disturbed the otherwise smooth unfolding
of the federal judicial power. But that is precisely why this story matters. By
demonstrating that one of the supposed modern endpoints of the teleological account of
constitutional history – general federal question jurisdiction – was actually achieved for a
brief moment in 1801, and that that achievement can be tied back to colonial ideas of the
proper division of authority in a compound government, this account suggests that many
ostensibly modern currents in constitutional thought are in fact recycled from earlier
debates, and that older ideas can remain compelling in vastly changed circumstances
from their original ones.
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